

**(g) support the Union's internal and external security policies**

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The content of the main EU strategic documents issued during the last 10 years regarding respectively internal and external security shall be considered in order to properly address the research priorities related to the mission "support the Union's internal and external security policies".

As regards internal security, we shall consider the "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (ISS), Towards a European Security Model" (2010) issued by the European Council, and the document on its implementation "The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe" (2010), issued by the European Commission.

Concerning external security, we shall consider the following documents issued by the European Council: "European Security Strategy (ESS), A secure Europe in a better world" (2003), "Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing security in a changing world" (2008) and the "Statement on tighter international security" (2008).

The comparison of key threats/factors highlighted in these documents results in a number of areas of intersection between internal and external security.

**Table 1 – European security in the EU strategic documents – Key threats/factors**

	<b>ESS</b> <b>2003</b>	<b>ESS Report</b> <b>2008</b>	<b>Council Statement</b> <b>2008</b>	<b>ISS</b> <b>2010</b>	<b>ISS 5 Steps</b> <b>2010</b>
Terrorism	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Organised crime	✓	✓		✓	✓
Weapons of Mass Destruction	✓	✓	✓		✓
Cyber/Information	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pandemics	✓	✓		✓	✓
Piracy	✓	✓	✓		
Regional conflicts	✓	✓			

Energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Poverty	✓	✓			
State failure	✓	✓		✓	
Cross-border crime		✓	✓	✓	✓
Natural or man-made disasters		✓		✓	✓
Infrastructures	✓	✓		✓	✓
Climate change	✓	✓			✓
Border security	✓			✓	✓
Violence	✓	✓		✓	
Others to be identified ...	?	?	?	?	?

Beyond these key threats/factors, the key “mandate areas” covered by the internal and external security policies should be properly considered. Internal security mainly corresponds to the field of justice and home affairs (JHA) while external security mainly corresponds to the foreign and security policy (i.e. the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, which includes the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP).

Since both are arguably extremely variegated domains, it is essential a reassessment of the strict separation between internal and external security goals embedded in EU structures, policies and practices.

The ESS originally expressed the concept that “with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad”. Such concept has to be implemented by assessing the possibility for internal security actors to use CSDP activities for returns in internal security, and by considering JHA expertise as a crucial resource for EU foreign policy objectives such as promoting the rule of law and preventing state failure.<sup>1</sup>

How can we best direct investments towards research projects aimed at supporting the Union’s internal and external security policies?

The selection should focus on the areas of intersection shared by internal and external security, for instance terrorism, organised crime (mentioned at the strategic level), but also the protection of critical infrastructures and response to natural and man-made disasters (treated in implementation documents

<sup>1</sup> Florian Trauner, *The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?*, ISS Occasional Papers, March 2011, n. 89, p. 5, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op89\\_The\\_internal-external\\_security\\_nexus.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op89_The_internal-external_security_nexus.pdf)

rather than strategic ones, and/or just under the competence of those institutions which are in charge of JHA and CFSP/CSDP domains) and other possible areas/sub-areas to be identified up to implementation levels.

The areas of possible intersection should be properly verified through an analysis comprising at least three priorities of research:

1. The first research priority is somehow “ontological” and should be conceived as a precondition of the following ones, therefore its realization should be set within the first phase of Horizon 2020.

It should be devoted to the in-depth analysis of both strategic statements, starting from the wording of strategic and policy/normative documents, and the respective implementation documents. This will help to define in details the real contents of each domain, including also the “mandate areas” of those institutions in charge of JHA and CFSP/CSDP, behind the formal wording at strategic level.

This should enable the definition of the real commonalities between an area X (for example terrorism) of internal security and the correspondent area X (again terrorism) of external security.

In order to go beyond the wording used in strategic documents, it should be checked whether certain areas/sub areas mentioned only in the framework of external security (for example poverty) have in reality indirect effects on internal security (for instance by causing the conditions for large-scale illegal immigration towards Europe) although they are not formally mentioned in documents related to this domain.

Investments could therefore be optimized within the real borders of these commonalities, thus favoring a “functional” security in certain areas/sub areas regardless their formal and direct links to internal or external security policies.

2. The second research priority concerns the level of formal competencies and functioning (decision-making) of EU and national institutions and agencies in the areas/sub areas of intersection identified by the first research priority. This research activity should be conducted also at technical-operational level, again both at EU and national level, regarding also the mechanisms, the capacities and above all the procedures that are currently available (especially when it comes to improve interoperability).

The unavoidable areas of overlap and/or gap should be identified and managed with guidelines aimed at improving coherence and coordination among the variety of actors involved, bearing in mind that different situations require different solutions (at EU and at national level).

It shall be considered the potentiality of the Lisbon Treaty to improve EU institutional coherence in the complex balance between internal security needs and external security goals. This kind of analysis should also comprise a review of the provisions laid down in the Lisbon Treaty relevant for internal and external security policies, which: a) are new and not yet implemented, for instance solidarity clause, permanent structured cooperation; b) are already foreseen in previous provisions but never implemented, for instance the CSDP civilian operations including civil protection; c) are under implementation, for instance the changes concerning the EU mechanism of civil protection that will pave the way for more integration and better cooperation inside and outside the EU. Such analysis shall to reassess the viability of certain provisions and the possible measures to implement them.

3. The third research priority shall be devoted to map the technologies applicable to areas/sub areas of intersection identified by the first research priority. It shall aim to individuate shortfalls and direct investments accordingly, by avoiding duplication and taking advantage of double application of certain technologies.

Such mapping should not be separated from an accurate consideration of dual-use domains, bearing in mind that technology itself is not military or civil but rather is the application to make the difference. This shall consider the synergies pursued by the European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence among EC, EDA and ESA, whose overall aim is to prevent duplication between defence and civilian research in order to save resources, and to improve civil-military interoperability and standardization. This effort could also contribute to the process to define quality and size of security market in Europe, including the progressive extension of the dual-use segment, and the potential effect on the EU market itself.

Last but not least: in order to carry out the analysis described by the aforementioned research priorities, a proper involvement of relevant stakeholders is recommended at public and private, European and national, politico-institutional and technical-operational level, including experts and industry representatives, with the aim of identifying a “real” framework that will provide a basis for recommendations tailored to the “real” situation/needs.

Furthermore, it is recommended to provide proper access to relevant results of previous and current projects within the FP7, not only within the theme of security, but also concerning other fields (for instance former DG JLS).